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Whether or not a country may be said to be engaging in national 
economic planning will depend, first of al, on how the term "planning" 
is defined. The problem of definition is not an easy or clear-cut one 
in view・of the many ways, as well a~the gradations of degree, in 
which planning may be practiced. It is entirely conceivable, at one 
extreme, that no formal institutional apparatus exists either for for-
mulating a plan or for executing one, yet a・strong consensus and 
support among the major economic decision-makers as to longer range 
goals and the means of attaining .them results in the accomplishment 
of the goals. What we have in this instance is the complete absence 
of formal economic planning and an informal functional equivalent. 
Any reasonable concept of planning must involve a conscious pro-
gram of guiding national economic activity through the coordinated 
decisions of governmental bodies. In practice, certain minimum formal 
institutional arrangements are to be assumed, along with sufficient 
administrative powers in the hands of governmental agencies. For 
present purposes national economic planning, defined in a fairly strict 
sense, may be said to involve three factors: (1) the drawing up of a 
formal economic plan, (2) the existence of powers of implementation 
in the hands of governmental agencies, and (3) the willingness to 
employ the powers of implementation on a continual, day-to-day basis 
and in a reasonably coordinated fashion. Each of the above conditions 
requires some comment. 
The plan itself, in predominantly free market economies, is a com-
prehensive projection involving broad economic aggregates. For the 
key sectors, particularly the "growth" industries, the data will generally 
be more refined. Since the plan objectives are concerned with deter-
minants of growth and structural change the key variable to be 
manipulated will be investment, and the time span will be medium to 
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long-term. Stabilization policy is, properly speaking, outside the scope 
of the plan. The second condition is that government bodies (mainly 
the ministries) be in a position to influence the more critical variables-
in particular, investment-both quantitatively and qualitatively. This 
can be accomplished either by control over decisions made within the 
public sector or through effective influence on the private sector or, 
in the realistic case, by both. The assumption is made that in a free 
enterprise market system private firms will not, of their own accord, 
conform to a national economic plan program. Thfl final point, and a 
sine qua non for effective planning, is that the powers of implementa-
tion be actually used on . acontinuous basis ; in effect, that the plan 
be made fully operational. This requires, of course, that the relerant 
government bodies pursue their own activities in conformity with the 
plan goals. 
The above, then, represents a set of criteria by which effective 
;national economic planning may be judged. All three conditions need 
not be found together, at least to the same extent. In the sodalist 
system of the Soviet Union al three are present in the strongest 
possible practical form. Indeed, the plan itself is, technically, legally 
binding on the overwhelming majority of firms that comprise the public 
sector. At the other. end of the scale is the United States, which scru-
pulously avoids any display of national economic planning. Nevertheless, 
the absence of a plan does not prev:ent the government from establish-
ing goals of a national character in areas deemed of vital national 
interest. In these cases very stro:ng financial support will be provided 
by governmental agencies to the・private sector. Perhaps the best 
examples are to be found in the support given to pure research and 
to the training of scientists and engineers at the graduate level in the 
universities. A_bout 80彩 ofthe pure scientific research done in the 
United States is financed, one way or another, by the government, and 
a very high proportion of al advanced students in the science and 
engineering,fields are subsidized by government funds at some stage 
of their trai_ning. It is not as a result of the interplay of free market 
forces alone that the United States ranks highest among the free 
nations in the number of trained scientists and engineers per thous-
and of population. ・ 
The free-market economies. of western Europe are generally less 
allergic than the United States in their attitudes toward explicit plan-
ning approaches, and provide interesting examples of variety and 
degree of planning. Italy possesses a large public sector and is able 
to exert strong controls over the financial sector, of the economy. 
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Nevertheless, for political and social reasons, there is actually a mini-
mal amount of formal planning. Formal central planning has probably 
evolved the least in West Germany, partly for political and ideological 
reasons, .but also because the informal arrangements for coordinating 
business decisions in the private sector serve some of the purposes 
of formal, centralized planning. In France, on the other hand, the 
historical record of lack of discipline and coordination in the national 
interest of private economic groups encouraged the government to 
take a strong hand in directing the economy. France, therefore, may 
serve as・a convenient example of strong economic planning in a 
basically free-market system and as a model for comparison purposes. 
French post-war planning begins with the First Plan for reconstruc-
tion (1947-1952) and, except for a year's gap between the First and 
Second Plans, is continuous up to the current Fifth Plan (1966-1970). 
In the decree of January, 1946 which provided for the drafting of the 
First Plan there was, at the same time, established a specialized plan-
ning body, the Commissariat du Plan. From an institutional point of 
view the status of the Commissariat is of especial interest. It is the 
key organ for the coordination of the g。vernment'seconomic policy 
and holds responsibility both for the drafting of the plan and for 
following the plan through the various stages of consultation and 
execution. The unusual feature of the Commissariat・is its position 
among the ministries and other. agencies. Placed outside the normal 
structure of government relationships it is responsible directly to the 
Prime Minister's office and derives much of its influence from support 
at top government levels and, in particular, from the Finance Ministry's 
Department of Treasury. It is a major point of policy to maintain the 
Commissariat as neutral as possible with respect to the rivalries and 
competition for power which inevitably adse among governmental 
bodies. It is with this in mind that the staff is deliberately kept small, 
with virtually al the technical work relating to the plan performed 
by other agencies. Ultimately, the objective is to produce a plan receiv-
ing the broadest possible support among the separate economic interest 
groups, and a major task of the Commissariat is to secure this support 
through its extensive representation on committees and through its 
informal contacts with influential individuals in both the public and 
private spheres. 
Contact with the plan by・the major economic groups is secured 
via the various Planning Commissions, with representation by employ-
ers, workers, and high-level government bureaucrats. The Commissions 
provide much of the basic industrial data on which the economic 
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forecasts are made, but they are also free to comment on any・aspect 
of the plan and its parts. Consultation on the plan, both in the initial 
and'final stages of plan drafting, is secured formally by participation 
of two bodies, the Economic and Social Council and the High Planning 
Council. At this level of consultation broad social goals, as well as 
important and relevant political factors are likely to be taken into 
account. 
Plan implementation relies heavily on the public sector, and this, 
in fact, is considered the key to effective planning in France. It is a 
consequence of the exceptionally large expenditures generated in this 
sector. Government ownership is especially prominent in the energy 
and transportation fields, with coal, gas, and electricity al nationalized, 
anQ. with significant government participation in the field of oil explo-
ration and development. It may be noted that Electricite de France is 
the largest single investor in the country. In transportation the railroads 
are nationalized and the government holds a majority interest in Air 
France and in the shipping, companies. In the industrial sector itself 
government ownership of enterprises is limited to a very few cases, 
though the impact of purchasing policy of the public sector is strong 
in many industries. 
In its ability to manipulate credit conditions the government is in 
a strong position to influence the level and direction of investment in 
the private sector. The situation in France is similar. to that in Japan 
in that private enterprises are heavily dependent upon financial institu-
tions for their investment funds. Typically, something over a third of 
total gross private investment is externally financed. Credit conditions 
are carefully controlled by the government through the central bank 
(Banque de France) and the various specialized credit institutions 
(especially the Caisse des Depots et Consignations and the Credit 
National), which are either publicly owned or privately owned but 
publicly controlled. Loans to private firms are also available through 
the Economic and Social Development Fund which employs Treasury 
funds. Finally, there are a number of fiscal devices available which 
serve to encourage certain desirable areas of economic activity, such 
as interest grants from the Treasury and tax exemptions ("fiscal 
contracts") which are provided at the discretion of the Ministry of 
Finance. All in al, these represent a. formidable array of powers at 
the disposal of government authorities. 
The record indicates that the government has been willing to 
employ these powers and, moreover, to employ them in a manner which 
supports the national plan. Conformity with the plan on the part of 
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the public sector has been assured at least since 1962, when the Mini-
stry of Finance instructed that al claims on budget funds would be 
judged by plan criteria. Moreover, iri the provision of medium and 
long-term investment funds to the private sector it has been the practice 
for the credit institutions to consult with other agencies before passing 
on loan applications. Credit National, for example, has a standing aran-・ 
gement for consultation with the Planning Commissariat. The Com-
missariat, .in turn, will consult with the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Industry if the loan in question has a bearing on the plan. 
The general tendency is to keep plan implementation activities within 
manageable limits by concentrating on a limited number of firms and 
key industries. This, combined with the cooperation of the public 
sector, is considered to provide sufficient leverage for the plan. In 
terms of the threefold criteria employed in this paper there is litle 
question that the French system of planning represents a highly 
advanced one for a developed capitalist country. 
The planning system in Japan has seemip.gly enjoyed a reputation 
abroad for being thorough and effective. This point of view (which is 
not substantiated in this paper) undoubtedly stems fr9m the visibility 
of the apparatus for formulating plans and from the highly developed 
system of controls which have only recently been relaxed. The Econo-
mic Planning Agency (EPA), which has the authority for developing 
mediuni and long-term plans, dates from July, 1955. It was in dlrect 
line of succession to the Economic Counsel Board (1952-1955), which, 
in turn, replaced the Economic Stabilization Board which was establi-
shed in 1946. These changes represent the expanded'scope of planning 
activities and the changing objectives required by a continually deve-
loping economy. Under the EPA plμns begin with the 1955-1959 plan 
and continue to the Economic and Social Development Plan for 1967-
1971. All are five-year plans・except for the ten-year National Income 
Doubling Plan (1961-1970). It is interesting to note that al the plans 
were superseded before their terminal dates due to early fulfillment 
of plan objectives. The latest in the series of plans is a purely long-
range, indicative plan which was only recently announced whose target 
date is 1985. The goal is apparently to maintain both long and medium-
term term plans concurrently, with frequent revision of the latter. 
The status and role of the EPA deserves special comment. Since 
its establishment its functions have expanded considerably and it now 
boasts an elaborate・structure containing six bureaus and• fi~e subor-
dinate corinnittees and councils which it lists as "auxiliary organs". 
The EPA sees itself as the agency responsible for both formulating 
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and coordinating basic national economic policy policy, and claims 
equal status in the governmental structure with the ministries. Its hea_d 
is technically, a Minister of State responsible directly to the Prime 
Minister's ofice. The ministries themselves are, in EP A's view, pri-
marily administrative with respect to economic policy. This division 
of labor is not, however, widely shared. The ministries. in particular 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, enjoy a degree of 
administrative independence that permits them to express and practice 
their own policy views to a considerable extent. While it is true that 
consultations over the plans bring together the heads of the interested 
ministries and of the EPA at the cabinet and other levels, the evidence 
is clear that the main coordinating functions that EPA claims for itself 
are not, in fact, exercised. The picture that emerges is one of gover-
ment agencies and ministries carefully guarding their respective areas 
of jurisdiction and in・many instances seeking to expand these areas. 
One result is the frequent overlapping and duplication of activities, 
particularly in the research field. Judgement on this competitive environ-
ment for governmental bodies need not, of course, be negative. One 
highly placed oficial, for example, has expressed the opinion that the 
situation generates new ideas and an intellectual ferment which over-
ride the disadvantages. 
The contrast of EPA with its French counterpart extends also to 
their respective ranges of activity. The Commissariat du Plan, it was 
noted, concentrates entirely upon the plan in its various stages of 
formulation, consultation, and execution. Even the basic research and 
data-gathering are left to -other agencies to perform. EPA, however, 
by its own statements, feels committed to an involvement in virtually 
al phases of economic research and public economic policy. In addi-
tion to long-range forecasting and the presentation of .medium and 
long-term plans, it also counts among its regular duties the develop-
ment of short-term forecasting models along with appropriate policy 
suggestions regarding prices and wages, regional economic studies and 
recommendations, the presentation of national incmp.e statistics, an 
annual "White Paper on the Japanese Economy''(the English version 
is known as the Economic survey of Japan), White Papers on the 
world economy, arid various surveys. Most of these are produced by 
the EP A's Research Bureau, while "fundamental" research, including 
the publication and analysis of national income statistics is the func-
tion of the EP A's Economic Research Institute. The extent of over-
lapping with similar activities undertaken elsewhere is perhaps invitable 
in view of the fact that the ministries themselves maintain sizeable 
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economic research groups within their organizations. This can be seen, 
for example, in the industrial zones studies made during the past year 
by EPA and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry which 
incidentally, involved quite different approaches to the problem. 
Implementation of economic policy is the function of the ministries, 
among which the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry are most important for the plan. To a lesser extent 
the Ministries of Agriculture -and Forestry, Transport, and Construc-
tion are also relevant. What is now to be considered is the degree of 
control or influence which the various ministries can exert in their 
respective jurisdictions. Within the public sector control is, of course, 
complete. But state ownership is only partial for the transportation 
and communication industries (where publicly owned enterprises are 
concentrated) and the total impact in terms . ofplan support is very 
limited. Consequently, it is the ability of the ministries to influence 
the private sector that is of major concern for the plan. 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is in the 
most strategic position tq support the plan. It has wide・jurisdiction 
over a substantial segment of industry, including the important "growth" 
industries. Its, group accounts for probably more than 40彩 oftotal 
private fixed investment. MITI's influence is exerted in a number of 
ways. It controls licensing procedures for the more important kinds 
of business activity, including international trade and capital induction 
involving joint ventures of Japanese firms and foreign interests. It 
also distributes funds of the Economic Development Fund, . inwhich 
it has a voice in policy, and supervises safety regulations in industry. 
The legal basis for these powers tends to be some what vague, so that 
the interpretation of the law by MITI officials becomes extremely 
ii:nportant. Changes in policy come about through internal reorienta-
tion (usually based on private industry and government consensus) 
rather than by changes in the laws governing ministry jurisdiction. 
, At least until the very recent shift in MITI policy (announced in Jul況
1969) the tendency has peen for officials to follow a very determined 
and paternalistically protective policy toward the firms and industries 
under its supervision.'This has been especially apparent where local 
companies are arranging for joint ventures with foreign companies or 
where technological or・capital imports are being considered. MITI 
typically will scrutinize in detail such contracts and will frequently 
force renegotiations to secure more favorable terms. The protectionist 
attitude has been very evident also in MITI's policy toward the spe-
ctrum of commodity imports which are under its control. The situation 
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is similar for the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry which oversees 
most of the agricultural imports. 
In would by very difficult to define the actual legal powers of 
MITI. They are probably far weaker than MITI's actual influence 
would indicate. Its powers are exerted to a considerable extent through 
the informal techniques of "guidance", which became increasingly 
important with the drqpping of formal controls under the obligations 
of GATT; the IMF, and the OECD. "Guidance" is a technique which 
has been quite effective in the Japanese・business environment. It is 
based upon certain favors which MITI can dispense and also upon a 
basic mutual understanding between Ministry and private business 
officials with regard to broad economic objectives. The influence 
undoubtedly operates in both directions, and it would be a difficult 
task to determine which side has been the dominant factor. An often 
encountered opinion is that MITI policy is actually determined by the 
major private industrial interests which comprise MITI's group. The 
recently announced shift in its traditional protectionist policy in favor 
of one of non-intervention apparently reflects the changing views of 
the private business community. Also, the difficulties which MITI has 
recently experienced in its attempt to give direction to the automobile 
industry would indicate the effective limits of its power when dealing 
with a recalcitrant industry. ・ 
There are several questions that may be raised in connection with 
MITI's contribution to plan objectives. One concerns its actual support 
of the plan, a second coqsiders its ability to contribute to the pl~n, 
and the final question examines the effects of a new policy of non-
intervention on MITI's ability to contribute to the plan. With regard 
to the first point it has already been observed that the relative auto-
nomy of the ministries and their vulnerability to internal pressures 
place limits on their commitment to the plan. On the other hand, MITI 
is well situated to influence the determinants of growth, and the degree 
of support it provides the plan, even if such・support is incidental, is 
considerable. Indeed, the substantial extent to which MITI's policies 
have been growth-oriented has undoubtedly contributed to the impres-
sive growth record. Planning, in the'sense of modifying private business 
decisions in predetermined ways, is unquestionably what much of 
MITI's activities have been about. This is particularly the case with 
respect to the so-called "growth" industries, which MITI has been 
fostering so sedulously. However, it remains the case that a feeble 
connecting link between EPA and MITI exists. An interesting exercise 
would be to consider if MITI's activities would have been significantly 
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different in the complete absence of the EPA. It is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that it would• not have been. 
MITi's recently announced reorientation in favor of non-interven-
tion and capital import liberalization (with exceP,tions, as in the case 
of the "infant" communications and computer industries) undoubtedly 
represents a weakening of controls. On the other hand it is probably 
safe_ to say that the rapid growth and increasing competitiveness of 
many of MITI's charges have rendered the protective and paternalistic 
attitude bothersome and obsolete. In productivity terms a number of 
these industries compare favorably with their foreign counterparts. 
At the same time it is difficult to classify these same industries any 
longer as growth industries. The automobile、chemical,petrochemical, 
stel, and shipbuilding industries would seem to fit this description 
MITI will be, , inefect,. •concentrating on the role of protector and 
encourager of fledgling industries in the newer, more sophisticated 
science-based areas. It will therefore continue to be an import~nt factor 
in influencing growth through its ability to effect structural changes 
in the economy, while its impact on the activities of the established 
industries is likely to diminish. It may be observed that the pattern 
of capital-import liberalization that is emerging lends support to this 
prospect. 
Another substantial means of control over the private sector is 
exercised through the manipulation of credit conditions. While this 
area is associated primarily with short-run stabilization, there is never-
theless, an impact on longer-run conditions via the effects on invest-
ment levels. To the extent th-at credit policy is exercised in a discri-
minatory fashion by preferential credit treatment of selected firms and 
industries there will clearly be a structural impact on the economy. 
Indeed, a degree of unintended discrimination favoring the larger over 
the smaller firms is almost unavoidable and is probably more pro-
nounced in Japan where special bank liaisons favorable to the larger 
firms tend to be the rule. The record indicates not only readier access 
to bank credit for the larger firms, but also substantially, lower 
interest costs. There are, finally fiscal devices for providing incentives 
for firms engaging・in desirable activities, especially in the export field. 
These include tax exemptions and accelerated depreciation allowances 
which are, in efect, a tax deferment or interest-free loan. Their effec-
tiveness in recent years has been limited, however, since certain of 
the fiscal aids (such as tax exemptions on income derived from export 
activities) were considered subsidies by GATT and therefore inadmis-
sable. 
135 
568 闊西大學「純清論集」第19巻第4号
The situation_ in Japan has favored a strong emphasis on monetary 
and credit controls. Firms are highly dependent upon bank loans for 
their capital needs, while the commercial banks, chronically in an 
"overloan" position and with a high proportion of their loans in an 
illiquid form, are heavily indebted to the Bank of Japan. While the 
ratio of self-financed investment of private firms has fluctuated con-
siderably, depending on general economic conditions, it is typically 
very low. In 1955 the ratio, for the larger firms, was approximately 
40%, but in 1963 the figure dropped to about 30%. More recently there 
has been a tendency for the capital structure of firms to improve as 
a result of sustained higher profit earnings, leading to a slightly red-
uced dependence on outside sources of capital funds. Continued high 
profit rates and, even more, a reduced economic growth rate, would 
argue for diminished effectiveness of Bank of Japan credit policy. 
The techniques of control employed by the Bank (which is con-
trolled by the Ministry of Finance) include discount rate changes, 
"window guidance" applied to city bank loan applications, and the 
selective financing of both depressed and "key" industries. The first 
two are, of course, devices for maintaining short-run stabilization and 
are most effective when・the economy is already in an expansionary 
phase. Selective financing of "key'. industries, on the other hand, has 
a direct impact on industrial structure and therefore on long-run 
growth factors. The Ministry of Finance, with authority over national 
budget expenditures, exercises the most influence in this important 
area. 
Basic economic policy decisions would appear to be established, 
ultimately, by a small number of key individuals located in the Finance 
Ministry, the Economic Council, MITI, and a few of the other agencies. 
It is at this informal level that the broader problems of coordination 
are resolved to the extent that they are. The practice of respecting 
ministry and agency autonomy and of relying on the principle of con-
sensus results in a situation where the Hnes of authority for maintain-
ing coordination in policy are blurred and effective decision-making 
becomes the exercise of individual influence. This is, of course, very 
similar to the decision-making process at virtually・all levels of social 
organization. In moving from plan formulation to plan implementa-
tion a greater degree of enforced coordination and of more clearly 
established lines of authority, while satisfying the wishes of EPA's 
planning staf, would run counter to a strongly established bureaucratic 
tradition. 
As the situation now exists it is safe to say that the separate 
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components of the planning process are in strong evidence but that 
the process taken as a whole (in the sense discussed earlier in the 
paper) proves to be weak. Planning could be considerably strengthened 
by enforcing lines of authority, as, for example, enforcing ;EPA's co-
ordinating powers. How much of a disruption this would entail for 
established procedures in government is, of course, a serious question. 
To date, the vigor of the private sector has resulted in growth per-
formances that have consistently exceeded target goals. Under these 
circumstances there is a question as to wherether more thorough 
planning, which would involve increased interference in the private 
sector, is advisable or not. It would certainly appear unnecessary. 
Further doubt over the desirability of strengthening planning stems 
from questions concerning its effectiveness in its current state of deve-
lopment. The record of both France and Japan indicate a significant 
divergence between plan・goals and actual economic performance. 
Nevertheless, whatever the technical and practical defects of planning, 
serious difficulties encountered in trying to maintain adequate growth 
-performance or persistent balance of payments deficits are likely to 
elicit calls for more effective~conomic planning. 
The ability to implement the plan, in contrast to the cooperative 
willingness to do so, has already been considered in the light of the 
:tegal powers and other forms of influence exercised・by the ministries. 
Both actually and potentially it remains considerable. While "interna-
tionalization" of the economy will reduce the ministries'effectiveness 
in the private sector (this will be particularly true for MITI) their 
residual powers will nevertheless remain forn:iidable. The mutual res-
ponsiveness which characterizes the relationship between private indus-
try and public bodies is not likely to be seriously affected for a con-
siderable time and can be expected to contribute io growth and other 
economic and social objectives as in the past. 
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